	D. Chris Albright (No. 004904)	
ALBRIGHT STODDARD WARNICK & ALBRIGHT. P.		
	Quail Park I, Building D-4	
	801 South Rancho Drive	
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89106-3854	
	Telephone: (702) 384-7111	
	Facsimile: (702) 384-0605	
	Email: dca@albrightstoddard.com	
	-	
	Mark A. Fuller (Pro Hac Vice)	
	Glen Hallman (Pro Hac Vice)	
	GALLAGHER & KENNEDY, P.A.	
	2575 East Camelback Road, Suite 1100	
	Phoenix, Arizona 85016	
	Telephone: (602) 530-8000	
	Facsimile: (602) 530-8500	
	Email: maf@gknet.com	

Attorneys for Plaintiff

## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

## **DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

Plaintiff,	REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
·	COMPEL, MOTION FOR
VS.	PROTECTIVE ORDER, AND
	REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED RULING
STINGER SYSTEMS, INC.; JAMES F.	OR TELEPHONIC HEARING
MCNULTY, Jr.; and ROBERT GRUDER,	

No. 2:09-CV-00289-KJD-PAL

Defendants.

TASER INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Defendants acknowledge that they *deliberately* never disclosed or produced what they characterize as "documentary evidence . . . that shall once and for all, conclusively refute all of Taser's accusation [sic]." Dkt. 99, at p. 23. They insist that they had no obligation to do so. And not only that, they contend that they are well within their rights to produce these materials – whatever they might be – for the first time at a deposition they arranged among themselves. Far from being defensive about any of this, they trumpet it as some kind of strategic coup on their part. Whatever else can be said about this, what defendants have admitted doing is a clear violation of the rules governing disclosure and discovery.

First, the disclosure obligation. Rule 26 requires affirmative disclosure of all documents that a party "may use to support its claims or defenses," unless they are to be used "solely for impeachment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). Any documents which may "refute" TASER's claims, to use defendants' term, are substantive evidence which must be disclosed and produced, and cannot be withheld as being "solely" for impeachment. Otherwise, any defendant could simply withhold all documents he or she considered helpful, on the theory that they would be used to "impeach" the plaintiff's case. As Wright and Miller explains:

If a party plans to testify to one version of the facts, and the opponent has evidence supporting a different version of the facts, the opponent's evidence will tend to impeach the party by contradiction, but if discovery of this kind of evidence is not permitted the discovery rules might as well be repealed.

C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, §2015, at 212 (1994).

The case law is in accord. For a few of the many cases on this point, *see Klonoski* v. *Mahlab*, 156F.3d 255, 270 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1998)) (holding that district court "erred, as a matter of law," in ruling that excerpts from certain letters were exempt from disclosure as being "in "solely for impeachment purposes"; "The letter excerpts constituted substantive evidence because, separate and apart from whether they contradicted Dr. Klonoski's

testimony, they tended 'to establish the truth of a matter to be determined by the trier of fact.' This is true even though, in addition to their substantive content, the excerpts tended to contradict Dr. Klonoski's testimony"); *Chiasson v. Zapata Gulf Marine Corp.*, 988 F.2d 513, 517-18 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1993) (holding that surveillance materials were at least in part "substantive evidence," or "[e]vidence which would tend to prove or disprove" plaintiff's damages, and "should have been disclosed prior to trial, regardless of its impeachment value."); *Newsome v. Penske Truck Leasing Corp.*, 437 F.Supp.2d 431, 436 (D. Md. 2006) (parties must "disclose without request impeachment evidence which is admissible for substantive purposes under the automatic disclosure provisions of Rule 26(a)"). *See also Committee for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County v. County of Sonoma*, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 57969, \* 11 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("the exception in Rule 26(a) for evidence used 'solely for impeachment' is not equivalent to evidence used for 'rebuttal'").

Second, disclosure obligations aside, defendants were also served with requests for production of documents, requiring them to produce documents potentially relevant to the case. Copies are attached as Exhibit A. Because defendants have yet to inform TASER or the Court what materials they have been withholding, we are not in a position to link up particular documents with particular requests. But the Court can confirm that the requests for production were comprehensive. And the one example defendants *do* cite – documents related to relevant stock transactions – is something TASER *specifically requested. See* Exh. A (Requests No. 4 to each defendant). And not only did defendants fail to produce these documents, but as they note on page 3 of their response, defendant McNulty even asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as a bar to this discovery! Dkt. 102, p. 3 ("Defendant McNulty asserted his 5<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> amendment privilege against retrieving or identifying the location of requested financial documents.") In other words, defendants asserted an absolute bar to discovery regarding

stock transactions, and now intend to produce these materials in the midst of a deposition.

Defendants do make one good point. They argue that one of the sanctions available for violations of this kind is exclusion of evidence. Dkt. 102, at p. 4. This is certainly one of the sanctions the Court should consider imposing here. Recognizing the Court's wide discretion in this matter, TASER will not presume to tell the Court what the best and most appropriate course of action is under these circumstances. We do, however, urge the Court to take decisive action to put an end to this abuse of the litigation process. And the Court should assess appropriate sanctions not only against defendant McNulty, but also against counsel for defendants Gruder and Stinger, who participated in this misconduct and signed the response.

Finally, the depositions should be postponed. Defendants offer no argument otherwise. TASER is entitled to defendants' disclosure and responses to discovery before questioning the witnesses whose depositions are scheduled for next week.

TASER reiterates its request that the Court rule on this issue on an expedited basis, and if necessary convene a brief telephonic hearing in this regard.

Respectfully submitted this 24th day of August, 2010.

## GALLAGHER & KENNEDY, P.A.

By: /s/ Mark A. Fuller

Mark A. Fuller Paul K. Charlton Glen Hallman

2575 East Camelback Road, Suite 1100

Phoenix, Arizona 85016-9225

and

D. Chris Albright 1 Albright Stoddard Warnick & Albright, P.C. Quail Park I, Building D-4 2 801 South Rancho Drive 3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89106-3854 4 Attorneys for Plaintiff 5 6 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 7 8 I hereby certify that on the 24th day of August, 2010, I electronically transmitted the attached document to the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF System for filing and 9 transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following CM/ECF registrants: 10 P. Sterling Kerr, Esq. 11 Marvin L.P. Simeon, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF P. STERLING KERR 12 2450 St. Rose Parkway, Suite 120 13 Henderson, Nevada 89074 Attorneys for Defendants Stinger Systems, 14 Inc. and Robert Gruder 15 D. Chris Albright, Esq. 16 Albright Stoddard Warnick & Albright, P.C. Quail Park I, Building D-4 17 801 South Rancho Drive 18 Las Vegas, Nevada 89106-3854 Co-Counsel for Plaintiff 19 I further certify that on the 24th day of August, 2010, I served the attached 20 documents via electronic mail and U.S. Postal Service, First-Class Postage Prepaid, on 21 the following party, who is not a registered participant on the CM/ECF System: 22 James McNulty 23 10620 Southern Highland Parkway, Suite 110 Las Vegas, Nevada 89141 24 Defendant Pro Se 25 By: /s/ Donna M. Navarro 26 2526146 / 20791-0003